
Static Requirements Checking and Reachability Problem

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Agents and Environment




Basic Protocols

Basic Protocol is a triple

$$\forall x(\alpha \rightarrow < u > \beta)$$

- *x* is a list of parameters,
- α is a precondition,
- u process (action),
- β post condition



Transition consistency

- Consistent system has deterministic behavior.
- For each agent state preconditions should not intersect.


$$\forall (i,j) (i \neq j \land S_i = S_j \rightarrow \neg(\alpha_i \land \alpha_j))$$

- S_n agent state in precondition of basic protocol n.
- α_n precondition of basic protocol n.

Transition consistency

precondition:

Example of inconsistency



precondition:

Transition completeness


- Complete system never comes to deadlock.
- For each agent state disjunction of all preconditions should be true (taking into account restrictions).

$$\forall i \exists s \ (S_i = s \rightarrow R_s \lor \bigvee_i \alpha_i)$$

- S_n agent state in precondition of basic protocol n.
- R_s restriction for state s.
- α_n precondition of basic protocol n.

Transition completeness

Example of incompleteness



Safety

• First, initial state is checked

$$\forall x (I(x) \rightarrow Q(x))$$

- *Q* safety condition.
- *I* initial state.
- x a set of attributes.

Safety

 Second, each applicable basic protocol should be invariant relatively to safety condition.

$$\forall i (\alpha_i \wedge Q)$$

$$\forall i (Pt(\alpha_i \wedge Q, \beta_i) \rightarrow Q)$$

- Q safety condition.
- $Pt(X, \beta_i)$ environment state X transformed by postcondition β_i .
- α_i precondition of basic protocol *i*.
- β_i postcondition of basic protocol i.

Safety

Example of safety violation

safety condition: balance > 0



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precondition:
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phone(p, dial); balance > 0

postcondition:

phone(p, dialing); balance := balance - 1



precondition:

phone(p, dial); -50 <= balance <= 0

postcondition:

phone(p, warning)

- BP1 breaks safety
- Counter-example:
 - Let balance = 1;
 - Apply BP1;
 - balance = 0.

- Precondition of BP2 breaks safety
- What does it mean?
 - If safety is correct it always should be true, consequently, BP2 will never be applied – unreachable protocol;
 - Otherwise, safety is incorrect and should be revised

Reachability

- Found inconsistency, incompleteness and safety violations prove existence of "bad" states where system has nondeterministic behavior, deadlock or breaks safety conditions.
- Problem: Are these states reachable?
- Let's build formulas describing "bad" states.








precondition: $\alpha_i(x)$ postcondition: $\beta_i(x)$

precondition: $\alpha_i(x)$

x − a set of attributes



- Let protocols i and j are inconsistent. It means that the following formula is true: $\exists (x) (\alpha_i(x) \land \alpha_j(x))$ It is a "bad" state.
- Let protocols i and j cover incomplete state. It means that the following formula is true: $\exists (x) \neg (\alpha_i(x) \lor \alpha_j(x))$ It is a "bad" state.
- Let protocol i breaks safety Q. It means that some state X(x) exists such as the following formula is true:

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\exists (x) \ (\alpha_i(x) \land Q(x) \land X(x) \land \neg (Pt(X(x), \beta_i(x)) \rightarrow Q(x))) X is a "bad" state.
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
Approaches to reachability problem solution

- Approach 1. To implement some static filtering to avoid unreachable "bad" states:
- Let's consider negation of every "bad" state B as safety condition: $\neg B$
- If the system never breaks condition $\neg B$ then "bad" state B is unreachable it can be omitted.
- Otherwise the problem remains opened.
- Specification of user-defined restricted states is another method of filtering.
- Let R formula specifying restricted states.
- If formula $R \to B$ is true then "bad" state B is restricted and can be filtered.

Approaches to reachability problem solution

- Approach 2. Based on using model checking and symbolic modeling.
- Consider simplified behavior of the model and build directed graph of transitions using attributes subset.
 Let's choose agent state as a subset. It satisfies the following properties in any basic protocols system:
 - occurs in precondition of each protocol;
 - always has concrete value.

Approaches to reachability problem solution



- Graph nodes u_i are formulas which specify value of chosen subset of attributes (in this case names of agent states);
- Graph edges r_i are the names of basic protocols.
- Consider "bad" state B and find nodes such as: $u_i \wedge B \neq 0$
- Build all paths from the node specifying initial state of the system to found nodes.
- This set of paths is complete but redundant. These paths can be used for guided search in model checking or symbolic modeling as forward as backward.

Symbolic modeling

- Here we consider methods of state space generation in symbolic modeling.
- Pre- and postcondition of any basic protocol can be represented in the following form:
 - precondition: A(r,l,s,z);
 - postcondition: $B(r,l,s,z) = (r := t(r,l,s,z)) \wedge U(l,r,s,z) \wedge C(r,l,s)$.
- Here:
 - l the vector of list attributes;
 - r,s,z vectors of attribute expressions of numeric and symbolic types;
 - A(r,s,z) and C(r,l,s) basic languages formulas;
 - U(l,r,s,z) conjunction of list updating operators (l updated lists);
 - r := t(r,s,z) conjunction of assignments for attributes r: $(r_1 := t_1(r,s,z)) \land (r_2 := t_2(r,l,s,z)) \land \dots$;
 - z the vector of attributes which occur in assignments and list updating operators but absent in formula C(r,l,s).
 - all lists l are excluded from precondition A and assignments in postcondition because list access operators can be substituted by corresponding expressions (first or last element of a list).

Symbolic modeling

- Basic protocol is applicable on state class E if formula $E \wedge A(r,l,s,z)$ is true. Applicable protocol makes transition: $E \rightarrow E'$
- Here E and E' are formulas that specify state classes. They are represented as:

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- E = F(r,s,z) \wedge L(r,l,s,z)- E' = F'(r,s,z) \wedge L'(r,l,s,z)
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- Where:
 - F(r,s,z), F'(r,s,z) basic language formulas;
 - L(r,l,s,z), L'(r,l,s,z) list equalities:
 - $(l_1 = list(head_1(r,s,z), ..., tail_1(r,s,z))) \land (l_2 = list(head_2(r,s,z), ..., tail_2(r,s,z))) \land ...;$
 - $head_i(r,s,z)$ and $tail_i(r,s,z)$ sequences of expressions, can be empty;
 - ... abstract (unknown) part of the list; it's absent in lists with concrete length.
- Transition from given state to the next one is made by predicate transformers defined as functions of formulas deduction.

Forward predicate transformer

$$E' = pt(E \land A(r,l,s,z), B(r,l,s,z))$$

$$E' = pt(F(r,s,z) \land L(l,r,s,z) \land A(r,s,z), B(r,l,s,z))$$

$$E' = E_1 \lor E_2 \lor \dots$$

$$E_i = \exists (u,v) \; (\; F(u,v,\xi_i) \land A(u,v,\xi_i) \land T(r,u,v,\xi_i) \land L(l,u,v,\xi_i) \land P_i(u,v,r,s) \;) \land C(r,l,s)$$

$$T(r,u,v,\xi_i) = (\; (r_1 = t_1(u,v,\xi_i)) \land (r_2 = t_2(u,v,\xi_i)) \land \dots \;)$$

$$L(l,u,v,\xi_i) = (\; (l_1 = list(head_1(u,v,\xi_i), \, \dots, \, tail_1(u,v,\xi_i))) \land (l_2 = list(head_2(u,v,\xi_i), \, \dots, \, tail_2(u,v,\xi_i))) \land \dots \;)$$

- Here u,v - vectors of new variables introduced for signing old values of attributes r,s. L(l,u,v,z) contains updated lists after operators U(l,r,s,z) application. If one attribute of functional type occurs in postcondition more than once we should consider all possible identifications of its arguments. Formula $P_i(u,v,r,s)$ specifies one of such possibilities. ξ_i derived from vector z taking into account $P_i(u,v,r,s)$.

Backward predicate transformer

$$E = pt^{-1}(E', A(r,l,s,z), B(r,l,s,z))$$

- Let $(r = t(u,s,z) \land C(r,l,s)) \neq 0$ (valid postcondition). $F(r,s,z) = \exists v \ (F'(t(r,v,z),v,z)) \land A(r,l,s,z) \land P(r,s,z)$

- If formula F'(r,s,z) is false then given basic protocol could not be applied and corresponding behavior branch is not considered.
- List updating operators U(r,l,s,z) change list equalities in the environment state. U(r,l,s,z) contains operators:
 - add to tail(l, f(r,s,z))
 - $add_{to}_{head}(l, f(r,s,z))$
 - remove from tail(l, f(r,s,z))
 - remove_from_head(l, f(r,s,z))
- Updating of the lists and generation of list equalities L(l,r,s,z) is made by inverse operators to U(r,l,s,z).

Demo

- CDMA (target site) was checked by SRC.
- One safety condition formulated:
 - (SDU tsdu.SdfMsHHoCmpltT >= 0) & (SDU tsdu.SdfMsHHoCmpltT < 2)</p>
 - It means that timer never started twice and never stopped twice.

Tool	inconsistency / nondeterminism	incompleteness / deadlock	safety violation
SRC	118 pairs of protocols	6 classes of states	4 protocols
CTG with Maxtraces=10000 (28 protocols were not applied)	0 concrete states	110 concrete states	3 protocols